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Deepening v. Broadening: A False Dilemma?
 Five years after the last wave of EU enlargement, this 
EU Forum takes a step back to ponder the consequences 
of the Europe’s integration to an ever-wider circle of 
member states – from the six founding members to the 
current 27. 
 All contributors take issue with the conventional no-
tion that there exists an obvious tradeoff between “deep-
ening” and “widening” the European Union.  Based on an 
empirical dataset of EU treaty law, Frank Schimmelfen-
nig argues that, to the extent that there is a tradeoff, it 
is not so much between deepening and broadening as 
between “widening and tightening” – as membership 
increases, the Union may become temporarily more 
heterogeneous.  In a similar vein, Eva Heidberger’s study 
of the recent enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe 
highlights a phenomenon of “creeping integration”; in 
certain areas, the Commission was able to quietly assert 
the necessity of greater coordination, not only during but 
also beyond the enlargement process.  Jonathan Slapin, 
Anand Menon and Dan Kelemen’s seek to generalize the 
argument through a quantitative analysis of federations 
and international organizations; they argue not only that 
there is “no correlation between size and depth”, but also 
that “deepening and widening go hand in hand”.  Finally, 
Sara Hobolt’s inquiry into citizens’ perceptions of the 
relationship between widening and deepening reveals 
very divided public opinions: “While a majority of citizens 
are either supporters or opponents of both processes, 
over a third perceive a trade-off between deepening 
and widening, generally favoring deeper integration but 
opposing further enlargements.”  
 In sum, the main lesson of this EUSA Forum is loud 
and clear – there is no automatic tradeoff between wid-
ening and broadening.  How could conventional wisdom 
be so wrong?  The contributors to this EUSA Forum of-
fer insightful explanations.  Perhaps also were member 
governments so acutely fearful of the risks of enlarge-
ment that they took preventative measures to avoid a 
disintegration of Europe.  Whatever the case may be, 
it does appear as if conventional wisdom became, with 
each wave of enlargement, a self-defeating prophecy. 
The question is whether this pattern will continue, i.e. 
whether the balance of power among member states and 
social groups will continue to favor those who want to 
deepen the Union.  A serious trade-off between deepen-
ing and widening could conceivably arise if this ceased 
to be the case. 
Nicolas Jabko
EUSA Review Editor
Is there a widening-loosening trade-off 
in European integration?
Frank Schimmelfennig
 There is no convincing empirical evidence for the 
oft-evoked dilemma of widening and deepening in Eu-
ropean integration. During its 60-year history, the EU’s 
policy competencies and membership have generally 
co-evolved. Widening and deepening are, however, not 
the only large trends in European integration. Since the 
early 1990s, integration has been accompanied regularly 
by differentiation: the fact that EU rules and policies are 
not valid in all member states. The euro zone and the 
Schengen area are the most prominent examples.
	 So	maybe	we	do	not	find	a	detrimental	 impact	of	
widening on deepening because the real trade-off is 
between widening and tightening? This conjecture is 
based on the argument that enlargement increases 
heterogeneity. The integration and policy preferences 
and capacities of new member states often differ from 
those of the old member states. Differentiation is an ef-
fective method to accommodate such heterogeneity. It 
allows the old member states to exclude new members 
from individual rules and policies, without denying them 
membership altogether, if they fear that enlargement will 
undermine	the	efficiency	of	the	policy	or	the	utility	that	
they derive from integration. On the other hand, new 
member states may be exempted from individual obliga-
tions of membership, without having to forgo member-
ship entirely, if such obligations are particularly costly or 
difficult	to	sell	at	home.	Indeed,	each	accession	treaty	
contains a list of transitional arrangements consisting of 
exemptions from rights and obligations of membership 
for the new member states. 
 Empirically, however, the impact of enlargement on 
differentiated integration is limited. Data on differentiated 
integration in EU treaty law  show that the EU’s widen-
ing has so far not had a lasting effect of “loosening” the 
Union. The treaty law impact of the early enlargement 
rounds of the 1970s and 1980s was minor. In Northern 
enlargement, the new member states produced differ-
entiation for less than one per cent of all treaty articles. 
Greece started with a share of less than three and 
Portugal and Spain with less than two per cent. The 
enlargement rounds of the past two decades, however, 
produced differentiation in around 15 per cent of all treaty 
articles.
 Yet the differentiation effects of enlargement dimin-
ish rapidly and disappear completely after a few years. 
The average duration of differentiations for each of the 
Northern and Southern enlargement rounds of the 1970s 
and	1980s	was	approximately	five	years.	The	value	for	
the EFTA enlargement of 1995 was slightly lower at 4.7 
years. It is worth emphasizing that the higher number 
of differentiations in this enlargement round was not ac-
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companied by a longer duration. The average duration 
for differentiations from Eastern enlargement cannot 
be calculated precisely at this point because of many 
on-going exemptions. For the moment, however, the 
average duration is still in line with the earlier pattern. 
Moreover, those new member states (such as Estonia, 
Malta, or Slovenia) which have already terminated 
(almost) all exemptions did not need more than four to 
five	years	to	do	so.	This	was	even	faster	than	in	the	first	
period of integration.
 In sum, affecting roughly 15 per cent of the treaty 
base	initially	and	lasting	for	five	years	on	average	and	
less than 10 years at most, differentiation in the context 
of enlargement is best seen as a transitional instrument 
of adaptation that facilitates the accession process 
but does not produce long-lasting or even permanent 
discrimination or legal disunity. Even if we include dif-
ferentiation in the picture, the trade-off between widening 
and deepening does not resurface.
Frank Schimmelfennig
ETH Zurich
When Widening Makes Deepening
Eva G. Heidbreder
 A general trade-off between deepening and widening 
does not stand the empirical test. Although theoretically 
compelling, a growing body of analyses refutes the as-
sumption. Enlargements neither increase heterogeneity 
of positions in everyday EU decision-making across 
the board, nor per force lower the likelihood for more 
intense and expansive integration. Debunking the com-
mon wisdom as myth implies a new research agenda: 
how do horizontal and vertical integration actually affect 
each	other?	In	addition,	these	findings	take	us	back	to	
a core question of EU research: what are the drivers of 
integration?	Going	beyond	mere	falsification	of	the	as-
sumed deepening-widening tradeoff draws our attention 
the causal links of territorial expansion and the increased 
depth and width of joint EU policy-making.
 One conceptual angle to investigate whether and 
how widening is a cause for deepening is to start from 
the actual enlargement process and to focus on the 
unintended repercussions of its implementation. In 
this vein, the strategic approach developed for eastern 
enlargement raises a simple puzzle. The European 
Commission was assigned competences vis-à-vis the 
candidate states that went beyond the powers formally 
conferred to it in the framework of the EU acquis. During 
the pre-accession phase, the Commission thus applied 
double standards that were binding for the candidate 
states but not the member states. While in some policy 
areas, as foreseen, these special steering capacities 
expired at the moment of accession, the Commission 
stayed active in others. 
 Explaining the variance between the cases in which 
powers were contained to the pre-accession phase 
(nuclear safety, and anti-corruption policies) and those in 
which the Commission expanded its capacities beyond 
the enlargement realm (minority protection, administra-
tive capacity building, and cross-border cooperation), 
uncovers two conditions under which, indeed, policy 
making in the pre-accession context caused further 
deepening. All double standard policies meet a neces-
sary condition: the existence of a strong pressure to 
coordinate new policy problems at the EU level in face 
of the prospective enlargement. All policies that entered 
the agenda as double standards were highly political; 
they had so far remained outside the EU realm, but 
they were considered crucial problems in the candidate 
states. Moreover, the pressure for coordination increased 
in	all	five	cases	during	the	pre-accession	phase	because	
the Commission created policy solutions for problems 
otherwise	not	tackled	or	handled	less	efficiently	in	other	
international forums. 





at stake determines which instruments can be feasibly 
applied to implement a policy. If the utilized instruments 
do not openly expose the political clout behind the prob-
lem and threaten to shift political attention to the EU level, 
member states let the Commission intervene in basically 
any area. Therefore, distributive or soft regulative policies 
are probable candidates for further deepening, whereas 
the dawning creation of visible political authority will lead 
to an outsourcing of responsibilities from the EU to other 
international	 organizations	 that	 offer	 less	efficient	 but	
politically less demanding policy solutions.
	 The	findings	provide	answers	to	the	two	questions	
raised above. First, widening is under certain conditions 
a driver of integration. Enlargement extended the policy 
agenda to salient political areas, in which the old member 
states had no interest whatsoever to confer hard pow-
ers to the EU. At the moment of accession, the double 
standards limited to the candidate states had to be fully 
integrated, or else they disappeared. As long as the 
Commission could minimize visibility and political noise 
around its new powers, the member states accepted 
continued interference and hence deepening despite the 
highly political nature of the issues at play. Second, this 
mode of creeping integration is not necessarily unique to 
the	enlargement	context.	Therefore,	the	specific	mecha-
nisms observed in the reinforcing widening-deepening 
linkage reveal information about integration dynamics 
more generally.  That is why it is important to engage 
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with the research agenda that debunking the deepening-
widening trade-off has opened up.  
Eva G. Heidbreder, University of Konstanz 
Reference
Heidbreder, E. G. (2011) The Impact of Expansion on 
EU Institutions (New York: Palgrave/Macmillan) 
Wider and Deeper? Enlargement and Integration 
in the European Union
Jonathan Slapin, Anand Menon
and R. Daniel Kelemen
 The potential impact of widening – the enlargement 
of the EU to include additional member states – on 
deepening – increasing the scope and strength of the 
EU’s powers – has been a central concern of many EU 
scholars and of many public debates about the EU’s 
future.  Yet while the relationship between widening and 
deepening is recognized as one of the ‘big questions’ in 
the	field	of	European	integration,	many	academic	and	
policy analyses remain based on the recitation of dubi-
ous ‘common wisdoms’ – above all the assumption that 
widening impedes deepening. 
 The notion that widening should impede deepen-
ing has intuitive appeal and has found resonance in 
the theoretical literature, particularly in the IR literature 
on multilateral cooperation and collective action. Yet if 
we look to the empirical record, it is not clear that such 
claims are well founded.
 Our quantitative analysis of both federations and 
international	 organizations	 (specifically	 regional	 trade	
agreements) reveals no correlation between size and 
depth. Turning to the EU itself, widening and deepen-
ing have often gone hand in hand. Anticipation of the 
possible consequences of enlargement has frequently 
led member states to introduce institutional reforms that 
deepen integration. For instance, concern that the 2004 
enlargement could render EU institutions unworkable 
was a central motivation for holding three Intergov-
ernmental Conferences that reformed, and ultimately 
deepened, the EU.
 We argue that an institutionalist account can explain 
when and how widening and deepening go hand in hand. 
The impact of widening on deepening depends on the 
position of the enlargement state relative to the prefer-
ence distributions of existing member states across a 
range of policy areas. Unsurprisingly, widening is more 
likely to impede deepening with respect to an issue if 
the enlargement state is a preference outlier with an 
extreme anti-deepening position. However, the impact of 
adding a laggard state will differ across issue areas and 
may still encourage deepening. In policy areas where 
supranational actors already enjoy powers to act in the 
face of legislative gridlock, widening may facilitate deep-
ening. While expansion may create legislative gridlock 
and impede deepening in the short-term, it may also 
strengthen the role of supranational actors and provide 
the impetus for institutional changes that encourage 
deepening in the long term.
   Recent developments within the Union seem 
to	 confirm	our	 theoretical	 expectations.	Not	 only	 has	
EU decision making continued to function in a wider 
Union, but widening has promoted institutional reforms 
that have accelerated deepening. For example, work-
ing styles and rules of procedure have been adapted to 
cope with enlargement – thus, the European Council in 
June 2002 adopted ‘Rules for the Organisation of the 
Proceedings of the European Council’. Amongst other 
things, this called for some agenda items to be marked 
as not being for debate, the Presidency was given the 
authority to limit speaking time, and limits were imposed 
on the size of delegations. Similar adaptation has been 
evident in the Council of Ministers and other bodies.
 In contrast to many of the claims made in the litera-
ture, we argue that the effect of widening on deepen-
ing within organizations is highly contingent upon the 
nature of expansion. Whether widening impedes or 
fosters deepening depends upon the preferences of the 
new members and the nature of decision making rules. 
Moreover, a difference may exist between short and long 
term effects. Even if enlargement creates the potential 
for gridlock in the short term, in may create incentives 
for more reform in the long run.
Jonathan Slapin, University of Houston
Anand Menon, University of Birmingham
Daniel Kelemen, Rutgers University
Ever closer or ever wider? Public attitudes 
towards further enlargement and integration
Sara B. Hobolt
 Do citizens perceive a trade-off between an ever 
closer European Union and an ever wider EU? The 
process of ‘widening’ the European Union with more 
member states has often been seen to go hand in hand 
with the process of ‘deepening’ integration by transferring 
more	powers	to	the	European	Union.	Over	the	past	five	
decades the EU has managed to more than quadruple 
its	membership,	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 significantly	
extending the Union’s authority into new competence 
areas. However, the current economic crisis in the eu-
rozone has exposed deep divisions within the European 
Union, between euro insiders and outsiders and within 
the eurozone between the ‘paymasters’ in the North and 
the	countries	in	need	of	financial	support	in	the	South.	
Calls	for	closer	fiscal	integration	among	an	inner	core	of	
countries cast doubt on the notion that deepening and 
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widening are complementary, and it has been suggested 
that such a strategy to “deepen and narrow” is the only 
way to save the eurozone. 
 It has become increasingly clear that public support 
is a necessary requirement for further widening and 
deepening, but less is known about whether citizens 
perceive a trade-off between these two integration 
processes and if so, whether this has become more 
pronounced in recent years.  It is of crucial importance 
to understand why some citizens see deepening and 
widening as complementary whereas others perceive 
them	as	conflicting.	Of	particular	importance	is	whether	
a country’s status as an insider or an outsider in the 
eurozone	 and	 net	 contributor/	 net	 beneficiary	 of	 EU	
funds shapes the way in which citizens perceive the two 
processes of integration.
 Findings from an analysis of Eurobarometer data 
from the period since the big expansion of the EU in 
2004 show that while support for both deepening and 
widening have declined slightly since the onset of the 
eurozone crisis, generally these attitudes have remained 
remarkably	stable	over	time.	I	do,	however,	find	signifi-
cant differences across countries in citizens’ support for 
deepening versus widening. While a majority of citizens 
are either supporters or opponents of both processes, 
over a third perceive a trade-off between deepening 
and widening, generally favoring deeper integration 
but	opposing	further	enlargements.	More	significantly,	
such attitudes are concentrated within core eurozone 
member states and among the better-educated, more 
knowledgeable	citizens.	These	findings,	based	on	multi-
level analysis of Eurobarometer data, are consistent with 
utilitarian explanations of integration: they suggest that 
the winners of the integration process want to consolidate 
and strengthen the union, but close the door to additional 
(poorer) member states. In net contributor countries, 
such preferences are notably driven by concerns of ad-
ditional	financial	burdens	 for	existing	members	 rather	
than symbolic considerations. 
	 These	 findings	have	 important	 implications.	First,	
they suggest that attitudes towards European integration 
are multidimensional and that some citizens have mul-
tifaceted opinions on the integration process. Second, 
they	indicate	that	a	one-size-fits-all	model	of	attitudes	
towards integration may be inappropriate, since the 
factors that shape attitudes towards deepening and 
widening are conditioned by the national economic and 
political	context.	Finally,	these	findings	could	also	imply	
that we are moving towards a more divided multi-speed 
Europe, as opinion-leaders in the core eurozone coun-
tries are reluctant to foot the bill to expand the Union 
to include more members (and perhaps even bail out 
current members), whereas they are keen to support 
further integration among a core of countries.
Sara B. Hobolt, London School of Economics
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 EUSA BIENNIAL CONFERENCE
Baltimore, May 9-11, 2013
Call for papers and panels
The European Union Studies Association invites scholars and practitioners engaged in the study of Europe 
and the European Union to submit panel and paper proposals for its 2013 Thirteenth Biennial International 
Conference, May 9-11, in Baltimore, Maryland. This conference also marks the 24th anniversary of EUSA. The 
Program Committee plans to promote the broadest possible exchange of theoretical approaches, disciplinary 
perspectives and research agendas. Please note the following:
1.  On the basics of paper and panel proposals:
* We welcome both paper and panel proposals, particularly those that foster transatlantic dialogue. 
Panel proposals need to consist of three to four papers.
* Participants are limited to two appearances on the conference program (two papers or one paper and 
one discussant role; chair roles do not count toward the appearance limit). Participants should therefore sub-
mit no more than two proposals.
* For organizational reasons, the program is subdivided into seven substantive sections (integration 
theory in the EU and beyond; history and institutions; economics and political economy; sociology, political be-
haviour and elections; law, public policy and regulation; external relations, enlargement and security; teaching 
the	EU).	Please	indicate	for	which	section	you	would	like	to	be	considered.	Note	that	there	is	no	fixed	num-
ber of panels for each section. Choosing one section rather than another does not enhance or diminish your 
chances of having your paper or panel accepted.
2.  Other conditions:
* The Program Committee reserves the right to make changes to organized panel proposals, including 
their composition.
* You do not need to be an EUSA member to submit a proposal, but all those appearing on the confer-
ence program must be current EUSA members.
* We cannot honor individual scheduling requests; by submitting a proposal you agree to be available 
from 8:30 a.m. on Thursday, May 9 through 6:00 p.m. on Saturday, May 11.
The 2013 Program Committee is:
Program Co-Chairs
Adrienne Héritier (EUI)
Berthold Rittberger (University of Munich)
Mitchell Smith (University of Oklahoma)
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Sections under which proposals should be made:
Law, Public Policy, and Regulation
Tim Büthe (Duke University)
This section welcomes papers focusing on legal integration and the European Court of Justice, issues of rights and equal-
ity, and all substantive areas of EU regulation and public policy-making.
History and Institutions
Morten Rasmussen (University of Copenhagen)
This section extends to research on the designing and transformation of European political, administrative and legal insti-
tutions and the way they operate and develop over time. How do institutions operate under strong problem pressure? Do 
they absorb shocks by adjusting incrementally or are they subject to profound changes?
Sociology, Political Behaviour, and Elections
Alexander Trechsel (EUI)
This	section	raises	questions	regarding	the	specific	features	of	European	societies	and	the	changes	they	have	been	sub-
ject to in recent years. How does public opinion react to the transformation of European societies? How do political par-
ties,	interest	groups	and	social	movements	process	these	changes	and	influence	electoral	outcomes	and	public	policies	
as a response to these transformations? 
Economics and Political Economy
Waltraud Schelkle (LSE)
This section focuses on economic policies and dynamics ranging from trade to investment, employment, competition, 
fiscal	and	monetary	policies,	and	welfare	state	reform.	The	section	includes	research	on	critical	economic	developments	
such	as	the	financial	crisis	and	shifts	in	the	international	distribution	of	economic	power.
External Relations, Enlargement, and Security
Frédéric Mérand (University of Montréal)
This section includes all aspects of EU foreign and security policy; EU engagement in global governance; and EU devel-
opment, aid and capacity building operations. The section also includes work on past and potential future EU enlargement 
and EU relations with neighboring regions.
Integration Theory in the EU and Beyond
Walter Mattli (Oxford University)
This section focuses on general questions pertaining to the dynamics of integration such as the factors which drive a 
deepening or a weakening of European integration, the underlying political processes, structures and modes of gover-
nance. It also goes beyond the EU and asks whether similar factors drive regional integration elsewhere (e.g. Mercosur, 
NAFTA, ASEAN) or whether different factors are at work and produce different outcomes. 
Teaching the EU
John Occhipinti (Canisius College)
This section welcomes paper and panel proposals on any and all aspects of teaching the European Union.
The	firm	deadline	for	receipt	of	proposals	is	September	30,	2012.	You	will	be	notified	of	the	Program	Committee's	decision	
regarding your proposal by December 17, 2012.
To submit a paper or panel proposal: All proposals must be submitted via our online proposal submission forms, which 
will be located at www.eustudies.org beginning August 1, 2012. Proposals must be submitted via the website. We do not 
accept proposals by e-mail, regular mail or via facsimile.  Address all questions about the proposal process to eusa@pitt.
edu.
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EU as a Global Actor
Interest Section
The Court of Justice as Global Governance 
Actor in EU-US Relations
E.L. Fahey
 The role of the Court of Justice in foreign policy qua 
Global Governance is both a legal and political ques-
tion which has attracted little interest from scholars of 
political science and international relations studying 
the Court of Justice, less still lawyers. The Court is 
regarded	as	having	little	influence	on	EU	foreign	policy	
generally, even by those less hostile to this viewpoint, 
and, at the very least, as having expended little time 
construing or analysing substantive EU foreign policy.1 
There is little doubt but that the EU increasingly acts 
externally as a Global Governance actor, both politically 
and legally, particularly after the implementation of the 
Treaty of Lisbon, where it emerges with more legal 
and unitary coherence. However, its “actorness” is as-
sessed unevenly by lawyers and international relations 
theorists.2   Most studies of EU “actorness” focus upon 
the EU institutions more broadly pre-Lisbon, conclud-
ing that the EU is both hardly and highly developed in 
its foreign policy actions.3		The	significance	of	the	ac-
tions of the Court qua judicial actor remain very much 
a political science-like phenomenon- when analysis 
closely scrutinises what occurs outside the courtroom 
upon strategic interactions of other institutional actors 
in response to it unlike legal scholarship, which remains 
devoted to the study of internal courtroom activities. 
 Transatlantic relations provide a fertile laboratory for 
global governance scholarship, but less obviously legal 
scholarship. Yet despite the waning political importance 
of the EU to the US, transatlantic relations are rapidly 
increasing and deepening in number in recent times, 
particularly in justice cooperation. While more EU in-
stitutional actors and agencies, for example Europol or 
the European Banking Authority, may possibly generate 
transatlantic relations in law, the Court of Justice has 
had limited opportunities to review this “high politics” 
qua	“courtroom	activities”	There	is	a	rising	significance	
of law and legal theory to the Transatlantic Relationship. 
Transatlantic actors frequently deploy law as a politi-
cal tool, in one way or another. For example, in 2011, 
the US House of Representative passed legislation to 
explicitly prohibit the impact of EU law in the US legal 
order.4   Another example is constituted by EU amicus 
curiae submissions before the US Supreme Court in 
death penalty cases.5  EU-US policy and law-making 
is increasingly porous or “outside-in” and “inside-out,” 
between the two legal orders. Thus, the extent to which 
EU legal rules are transplanted or replicated in the US 
is growing, for example, the transposition of REACH in 
California. And thus the question remains, how would 
these	developments	 influence	 the	 review	of	 specific	
transatlantic policy and rules by the Court of Justice? 
	 More	specifically,	the	actual	origins	for	EU-US	rela-
tions lie mainly in bilateral regulatory cooperation agree-
ments, binding and non-binding rules, between the US 
and the then EC and now the EU, as well as Protocols, 
Exchanges of letters.  The most “successful” EU-US 
policy cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs since 
9/11 in particular is remark worthy in two other ways- in 
that	it	is	both	recent	and	prolific,	as	a	field	of	cooperation	
in extraordinary times. The extent of these legal obliga-
tions and their impact upon individual rights remains far 
more contentious than merely regulatory cooperation 
might generate. The US Attorney General, Eric Holder, 
recently claimed before the European Parliament that 
no rights violations have ever occurred as a result of 
any EU-US relations in the context of Justice and Home 
Affairs, thereby warranting further legal cooperation in 
these areas and beyond. Whatever about the merits of 
the substantive content of recent EU-US relations, as 
a matter of EU law there is a particular novelty to the 
legal formulation of the agreements entered into, but as 
a matter of EU law only and no more. For example, the 
most recent EU-US PNR Agreement expressly states 
that the Agreement is not a Treaty and is not amenable 
to review under US law, creating a curious quagmire 
for EU citizens affected by EU-US measures.
 An analysis of the legal effects of Transatlantic mea-
sures in the caselaw of the Court of Justice does not 
reveal much by way of quantity, marginally more than 
a comparable search of the US Supreme Court.6  The 
Court of Justice has also neglected to avail of opportu-
nities or possibilities in litigation to enlarge institutional 
powers or competences where possible.7  The limited 
amount of caselaw in this regard is indicative of much 
about the legal contours of EU-US relations. The Court 
has not perhaps acted in the interests of a “European” 
unified	approach	to	EU-US	relations,	prior	to	the	Treaty	
of Lisbon at least, however imperfect or challenging 
such an approach might seem to push for coherence. 
Nor has the Court acted to strengthen citizens’ rights 
or the hand of individual institutional actors, particularly 
in	 its	recent	high	profile	PNR	decision,	where	on	the	
contrary the Court may in fact be interpreted to have 
“gifted away” the power dynamic. The possibilities for 
the Court are, however, manifold, where it may act as 
an agent of change in global governance and also as 
guardian of individual rights, if it so wishes. 
E.L. Fahey
Amsterdam Centre for 
European Law and Governance
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The EUSA Executive Committee is 
pleased to announce the online publica-
tion	of	 the	first	EUSA	Biennial	Conference	
Special Issue of the Journal of European 
Public Policy (JEPP). This Special Is-
sue includes seven (revised) papers se-
lected by peer review from amongst those 
nominated by discussants and chairs as 
among the best presented at 2011 Bien-
nial EUSA conference. The Special Issue 
can be found at http://www.tandfonline.
com. The paper version is now available. 
We look forward to continuing this collabo-
ration between JEPP and EUSA in the fu-
ture and expect that 6-8 papers from the 
2013 EUSA Conference, May 9-11, 2013, 
to be held in the Baltimore/Washington DC 
metro area, will again be selected for publi-
cation in a future special JEPP/EUSA issue.
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Opening Pandora’s “Toolbox:” The European 
Union as an Actor of “World Society”
Didem Buhari
 Given the recent economic, social, and politi-
cal crises in Europe, it would be timely to study the 
EU’s global actorness from a global perspective that 
transcends the dichotomous thinking reinforced by 
the strategic-normative debate. The “World Society 
School” led by John W. Meyer (also known as the 
Stanford School’s sociological institutionalism) intro-
duces analytical tools – “world society”, “ritualized 
rationality”, and “disinterested actorhood”- to expand 
our understanding of global politics and society (see 
Drori and Krücken 2009; Boli, Gallo-Cruz and Math-
ias 2010; Buhari-Gulmez 2010). To begin with, rather 
than being insulated or cut off from the external en-
vironment, the EU is embedded in a “World society”, 
i.e. a decoupled, centreless, and dynamic global entity 
that provides universalistic blueprints for how to un-
derstand and behave in the world (Meyer 2001). Both 
the	compliance	deficit	within	 the	EU	and	 the	chronic	
failure	 to	define	European	cultural	 identity	 (Biebuyck	
and Rumford 2011) reinforce the assumption that the 
EU’s agency is less constituted by intergovernmen-
tal bargains or a particular cultural centre than global 
scripts -termed “global cultural myths” by Meyer and 
Rowan due to their historicity and bias for liberalism 
and scientism- actively promoted by epistemic, pro-
fessional communities and international organizations 
that cultivate a global mindset. The emphasis on the 
EU’s embeddedness in the global renders the tradi-
tional accounts of the EU’s global actorness highly 
problematic. 
 Rather than embracing the dichotomy of self-
interested vs. norm-driven actorhood, the World So-
ciety scholars suggest acknowledging “disinterested 
actorhood” (Meyer and Jepperson 2000). Disinter-
ested actors are those who advise “proper” (or self-
interested) actors on how to think and act by providing 
the latter with not only normative but also cognitive 
scripts enacted at the global level and thought to be 
universally	applicable.	By	definition,	disinterested	ac-
tors include international organizations, professional 
and epistemic communities who are not only problem-
solvers but also “trouble-makers” due to their constant 
efforts to rethink, reframe, and reorganize modern so-
ciety and politics. Their scripts are followed by mod-
ern actors -including nation states, societies, regions, 
groups, and individuals- who rely on external recogni-
tion and legitimation. In this context, due to its active 
contributions to the enactment and spread of global 
standards, the EU is a disinterested actor that is a 
crucial part of global legitimation processes. A recent 
study on the disinterested aspect of the EU’s global 
actorness is developed by Joseph Jupille and Brandy 
Jolliff (2011:9-13). Accordingly, compliance with the 
EU implies a search for external legitimation: the EU is 
seen as an authority that provides globally legitimate 
templates for action. Accordingly, in addition to its 
“market power” (Damro 2011) and “normative power” 
(Manners 2008), the EU holds the authority to prob-
lematize, transform, and reframe  (in line with world 
society scripts) the taken-for-granted visions of exist-
ing problems and available solutions in the national 
realm. For instance Turkey, an EU candidate country 
that is infamous for its failure to implement strategic 
and normative conditionality, has already experienced 
radical processes of cognitive transformation involving 
the	redefinition	and	reframing	of	key	political	concepts	
such as national sovereignty, secularism, and minority 
amongst others. This means that the EU’s conditional 
pressures do not only trigger strategic and normative 
debates, but also cognitive efforts to embrace globally 
endorsed	definitions,	categories,	methods,	and	solu-
tions. 
 Finally, the World Society School challenges 
the prevailing dichotomy of optimal vs. bounded ra-
tionality -or Calculus vs. Cultural logic (Hall and Taylor 
1996) or logic of expected consequences vs. logic of 
normative appropriateness (March and Olsen 1998)- 
which respectively inform rationalist and constructivist 
approaches to the EU’s global actorness. The optimal-
bounded rationality debate centres on determining 
whether (i) the EU’s actorness follows “utility-maximi-
zation”	or	“satisficing”,	(i)	the	EU’s	behaviour	is	instru-
mental or norm-driven, and (iii) environmental effects 
on the EU are of strategic or of normative character 
(See Table 1). While optimal rationality focuses on 
one’s tendency to compute all possible outcomes of 
an action before acting, bounded rationality highlights 
the time, normative, and cognitive constraints that lead 
one to fail in one’s search for optimal solution. Alterna-
tively, the World Society School treats rationality as 
a cultural norm that constitutes legitimate actorhood 
in the modern world, rather than an inherent ‘fact’ of 
social and political life. In this sense, actors resort to 
post-hoc rationalizations to justify their scripted behav-
iour. By using the term ‘ritualized rationality’, the World 
Society School helps to uncover the general tendency 
to follow the logic of heuristic decision-making. Such 
logic involves using mental short cuts to understand 
complex phenomena (Leading political scientists on 
heuristics are Herbert Simon, Daniel Kahneman, Alex 
Mintz). Hence, without knowing anything about the 
topic	at	hand,	one	still	finds	a	short	cut	to	judgment	by	
referring to an abstract principle or an authority that 
one deems legitimate (Johns 2009:575). 
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 So, unlike optimal and bounded rationality 
which assume that actors inherently seek to maxi-
mize	 efficiency,	 ritualized	 rationality	 de-emphasizes	
purposive actorness. It rather draws attention to the 
ceremonial and post-hoc nature of rationalizations 
underlying actorness: “ritualized rationals” embrace 
scripts not solely because they are certain that the 
latter could solve their particular problems or grant 
them normative superiority, but also –and most im-
portantly- because the scripts are globally endorsed 
and have a “taken-for-granted” character. According 
to such path-breaking perspective, the EU’s frequent 
reference	 to	 scientific	 and	 UN-	 or	 INGO-promoted	
“evidence” reinforces the assumption that EU-led re-
forms are embraced abroad not only because they are 
“beneficial”	or	“appropriate”	but	also	because	they	are	
globally endorsed/legitimated. This suggests revisiting 
interest-based accounts of the EU’s effect on domes-
tic politics and society: Compliance with the EU condi-
tionality tends to be ‘ritualized/ceremonial’ rather than 
a clearly “thought-out” process. As if performing a ritu-
al, national parliaments pass EU-led reforms that have 
been lumped together without much consideration of 
their	 specificities;	 and	 no	 parliamentarian	 has	much	
idea of how to put these reforms into practice in a spe-
cific	 context.	However,	under	 the	constitutive	effects	
of global rationalization processes, national decision-
makers resort to post hoc instrumental explanations 
for their scripted behaviour (Meyer 2007:795). Conse-
quently,	it	is	difficult	to	apprehend	the	bias	introduced	
by post hoc rationalization, which misleads many to 
favour strategic accounts of the EU’s global actor-
ness. Nevertheless, serious political research usually 
reveals confessions made by national political elites 
that ‘the national interest is something you invent on 
your way to the airport’ (quoted in Sjursen 2006:99). 
 In sum, the study of the EU’s global actorness 
needs a global theory that transcends prevailing di-
chotomies in political research. The World Society 
School introduces important “tools” –world society, dis-
interested actorness, and ritualized rationality- to move 
beyond a possible theoretical impasse by grasping the 
cognitive dimension and thus, the “bigger picture” in 
European studies. It puts a special emphasis on the 
cognitive transformations the EU is triggering through 
its conditional stimuli. The World Society School also 
revolutionizes studies on the relationship between 
Europe and globalization with its structurationist ap-
proach: Instead of being merely a gatekeeper against 
global	flows	(as	evoked	by	terms	such	as	Schengen-
land or Fortress Europe), the EU could also be thought 
as a gateway to global legitimation processes due to 
its primary role in enacting and spreading the world 
society’s scripts (Rumford and Buhari-Gulmez 2011; 
Rumford and Buhari-Gulmez 2012). 
 
Didem Buhari, University of London
Table 1. Three types of rationality
Rationality Optimal Bounded Ritualized
Actor-Action 
Relationship
Actor effectuates and 
reverses action
Actor effectuates action but 
is less able to reverse it
Action constitutes 
actorness
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Commerce, Crisis, and EU Health Policy
Holly Jarman
 Reactions to the economic crisis in Europe 
frequently involve retrenchment of public health care, 
and in a few countries explicit privatization of health 
care responsibilities. Moreover, the European Union’s 
existing policy frameworks, and developing agendas 
as distinct as health care services regulation and pe-
ripheral bailouts, are creating an explicitly pro-market 
framework for health care. 
 European states are currently maintaining a 
precarious balance between the old models of health 
policy decisionmaking in the context of welfare states, 
and the new realities of global markets. Ongoing 
trends towards the commercialization and globaliza-
tion	of	healthcare	pose	significant	challenges	for	Eu-
ropean policymakers. Legal frameworks governing 
crossborder healthcare -the movement of patients and 
medical professionals from one state to another, the 
commercial presence of foreign health providers, and 
crossborder health services- have been created which 
need to be supplemented by stronger policies if they 
are	 to	 fulfill	member	state	promises	 to	promote	high	
quality healthcare that is broadly accessible.
Some Context
 Now might not seem like a good time to call 
for the strengthening of health systems in European 
Union member states. As I write this, the Eurozone 
is experiencing yet another wave of political turmoil 
and economic uncertainty in the ongoing, slow motion 
car	wreck	that	is	the	current	financial	crisis.	Strategies	
to bring back economic growth in ailing EU countries 
have revolved around debt reduction, to be achieved 
via public spending cuts, which frequently include cuts 
to health and social services. 
 Under great pressure to appease markets and 
debtors, several member states have dismembered 
their health systems. Ireland, a historically underfund-
ed health system, saw its health budget cut by 26 per 
cent in 2009, with a further Eur746 million cut for 2011. 
In Greece, the health budget decreased by Eur1.4 bil-
lion in 2011, with deep and rapid cuts to hospital fund-
ing. In the same year, Italy announced extensive bud-
get cuts to health care infrastructure, research funding, 
and disease prevention, and tight new budget caps on 
regional pharmaceutical spending (Mladovsky, Srivas-
tava, Cylus, et. al. 2012). Other governments, such 
as the United Kingdom and Portugal, have radically 
reformed their health systems in an attempt to control 
the rising costs of care.
 On top of the current economic instability and 
pressure for austerity, European governments already 
face some severe longterm challenges which will im-
pact their health systems in the decades to come. De-
pending on the state, these challenges can include ag-
ing populations which require more care and pay fewer 
taxes, shortages of healthcare professionals such as 
doctors and nurses, or rising healthcare costs which 
challenge public budgets. In trying to tackle these is-
sues over several decades, governments have intro-
duced successive policies aimed at rationing access 
to treatment and limiting price rises. It can be argued 
that European welfare states have entered an era of 
permanent retrenchment, a ‘silver’ age of more lim-
ited state-sponsored health and social services which 
pales in comparison to earlier models of the welfare 
state (Ferrera 2008).
 Both these short and long term factors have 
placed considerable pressure on health budgets. But 
there are other, simultaneous, trends which are just as 
important in shaping current and future health policy. 
While	member	states	enact	austerity	measures,	offi-
cials at the European level are focussing on making 
markets. Strategies to bring back economic growth 
put forward by the Commission focus extensively on 
negative integration and the liberalization of services 
throughout the internal market. The proposed Single 
Market Act, adopted by the Commission but not yet by 
member states, calls for the standardization of servic-
es at the European level via the European Standard-
ization System, liberalization of public procurement 
policies,	simplified	procedures	 for	mutual	 recognition	
of mobile workers, and the construction of a ‘digital 
single market’ which can empower consumers and in-
crease the ‘effectiveness’ of public services and pro-
curement (European Commission 2011).
 Finally, these measures have been put forward 
in the context of ongoing international trends in health-
care which are promoting the creation of crossborder 
markets in health. Many states, both within and out-
side the EU, are interested in promoting themselves 
as destinations for Europeans seeking to undergo 
medical treatment. Patients around the world are 
choosing to travel for various reasons, including to ac-
cess certain specialist procedures unavailable in their 
home state, bypass long waiting lists, or to obtain care 
at a lower cost (Glinos et. al. 2010). As states invest in 
attracting patients from elsewhere, they are creating 
strong commercial lobbies which support liberalizing 
trade in health services at the global level.
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that they should be excluded from the internal market 
(Hervey 2011).
 The modern EU was built around a customs 
union, and the Common Commercial Policy, which ap-
plies a common external tariff to goods entering the 
Union, is one of the oldest EU competences. Until 
the Treaty of Lisbon, the Commission and the Coun-
cil dominated trade policymaking among EU member 
states. The Commission could propose trade policy 
agenda items to the Council, which would in turn for-
mulate a mandate for the Commission to negotiate on 
behalf of the EU member states. The TFEU greatly 
enhanced the role of the European Parliament in this 
process, with framework legislation in trade and in-
vestment, and implementing legislation for the Com-
mon Commercial Policy are now decided using the 
ordinary legislative procedure (Kleimann 2011).
 To date, the EU has not made many commit-
ments in international trade negotiations to liberalize 
external trade in health services, but it has made some 
qualified	commitments	in	the	areas	of	hospital	and	so-
cial services. The TFEU takes an important step by 
making trade in services an exclusive Union compe-
tence, which potentially reduces the need for mixed 
agreements	 requiring	 national	 parliamentary	 ratifica-
tion (Eeckhout 2011), although this area of EU law 
still seems untested and susceptible to future member 
state and Court actions. The scope of the EU’s health 
services commitments may well change in the future, 
as	the	increased	influence	of	the	Parliament	over	the	
trade policy process alters the structure of opportunity 
for health providers, policy advocates, and other lob-
byists.
 Finally, it may be the Troika of the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank, and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, and not the EU’s legisla-
tive	process,	which	has	the	most	significant	impact	on	
the future shape of health policy in certain Eurozone 
states. National bailout packages for Ireland, Greece 
and	 Portugal	 included	 some	 very	 specific	 directions	
about the reform of these countries’ health systems 
(Fahy 2011). Some of these reforms may well be ap-
propriate, and some may be sorely needed. But they 
do not stem from democratic mandates. They are not 
the directives of health ministries or health policy ex-
perts.	 Nor	 are	 they	 reforms	 specifically	 designed	 to	
improve or maintain health outcomes.
 In short, the pattern of EU authority over health 
services	reflects	the	tension	between	health	systems,	
which are largely bound to national territories, and 
goods and services markets, which cross national bor-
ders.	Member	states	have	the	power	to	define	health	
policy,	 and	 to	 manage	 and	 finance	 health	 services	
and medical care, although the TFEU commits EU 
What might the EU do? Who has health policy 
competence?
 What explains how the EU can do these 
things? The adoption of austerity and retrenchment 
measures, the proposed ‘relaunch’ of the internal mar-
ket, and the ongoing globalization of healthcare mar-
kets, are part of a new and distinct policy environment 
for European health systems. This policy environment 
is more international than in previous decades. It con-
tains weaker proponents of public services, and more 
officials,	 managers,	 cross-national	 companies	 and	
other organizations supporting private ownership, op-
eration, and funding of healthcare services. It is politi-
cally	conflictual,	and	legally	complex.	How	well	will	the	
EU institutions and member states adapt to this new 
environment?
 Substantial health policy competence at the 
EU level is relatively new. Although the central EU 
institutions have had some ability to coordinate ele-
ments of health systems and public health policies for 
decades, passing important legislation in blood and 
cancer policy, and crossborder emergency care, this 
authority has not always been explicit in the EU trea-
ties themselves.
 In the last few years, this picture has begun to 
change, with a much broader EU-level health policy 
realized and implemented through internal market law. 
This has happened in three ways. First, through a se-
ries of European Court of Justice decisions which es-
tablished de facto EU competence in health services by 
applying the principles of internal market law. Second, 
by the Directive on the Application of Patients’ Rights 
in Crossborder Healthcare, which translated the ECJ 
jurisprudence into legislation using the language of 
human rights and consumer choice. And third, through 
the Lisbon Treaty, which granted the Union new pow-
ers to set public health policies in areas such as health 
security, alcohol policy and tobacco control.
 In contrast with their historically weak powers 
in health, the EU institutions have long held stronger 
authority over aspects of the internal market and ex-
ternal trade, meaning that existing EU competences to 
shape	markets	have	a	strong	influence	over	the	direc-
tion of EU health policy. Internal market law is the most 
common form of EU law. It is a shared competence, al-
though the Union holds important powers to set some 
of the laws which shape the internal market, in areas 
such as competition policy. Although there has been 
considerable political resistance to the application of 
internal market law to health among both member 
states with publicly funded health systems and social 
policy activists, the ECJ has consistently rejected ar-
guments that health services are ‘non-economic’ and 
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institutions to encourage cooperation between mem-
ber states on health services in ‘cross-border areas’. 
Where trade and health collide most forcefully, in ar-
eas where competences are shared and complex, it is 
likely	that	the	ECJ	will	end	up	redefining	the	boundar-
ies of these policy issues, while the increased power 
of the European Parliament may see greater attention 
paid to ‘domestic’ policy areas.
If You Build It, They Will Come
 To say that this more international policy envi-
ronment may have lasting effects on health systems 
in Europe is not too far fetched. In the last 15 years, 
the EU has moved a long way towards creating a de 
jure internal health market. In other words, the Court 
has ruled, and the other EU institutions have legislat-
ed, to promote an internal market in health services, 
in a way that is largely independent of the extent of 
actual crossborder economic activity in health.
	 First,	health	has	been	defined	in	EU	law	and	
policy as a commercial service, and patients as con-
sumers of that service. A series of European Court 
of Justice decisions, starting with Kohll and Decker in 
1998, applied EU internal market law to health. This 
critical	path	of	 legal	decisions	confirmed	 the	 right	of	
EU citizens, as consumers, to consume health ser-
vices in states other than their home state. With some 
limitations, the Court decided that crossborder pa-
tients should be reimbursed by their home state for 
healthcare obtained abroad. This raised substantial 
questions about the ability of EU member states to 
manage the capacity of their own health systems, 
resulting in panic and pushback from national policy-
makers.
 In response to calls from member states for le-
gal certainty on this issue, the Commission proposed a 
Directive on crossborder patient mobility in 2008. De-
spite continued contention among EU interest groups, 
and delaying tactics from some member states, an 
amended version of the directive was adopted into 
EU law in February 2011. The Directive on the Appli-
cation of Patients’ Rights in Crossborder Healthcare 
followed the Court’s jurisprudence by protecting the 
rights of EU citizens to consume health care in states 
other than their home state, with the costs paid for by 
their home state. These legal changes have strength-
ened the potential ability of EU citizens to demand 
crossborder healthcare, regardless of the fact that the 
actual number of people crossing state borders to ob-
tain care remains fairly small.
 This may not be the case in the longer term, 
however, as a constellation of actors recognize the 
potential of the EU as a health market. With its aging 
population and publicly funded health services, the 
EU is seen by many internal and external actors as a 
large potential market for the health services that they 
provide.
 Globally, states such as Singapore, Thailand, 
India, Costa Rica, and even Japan have been promot-
ing medical tourism. Indian health providers, for exam-
ple, see telemedicine, including teleradiology and re-
mote monitoring, as the set of services they are most 
likely to sell to Europeans (Smith and Chanda 2009). 
At the same time, prominent health providers, clinics, 
and hospital chains have been investing in their global 
operations, and key private health insurers (such as 
Blue Cross) have begun to create products that allow, 
and even incentivize, crossborder patient mobility.
	 European	politicians	and	EU	officials	 are	not	
immune to this enthusiasm. The health sector forms 
a huge part of the EU’s overall economic activity, and 
can	be	seen	not	just	as	a	drag	on	public	finances,	but	
as a potential contributor to them. If rising global de-
mand for healthcare can be met within Europe, it is 
argued, the highly skilled EU health workforce and 
advanced medical technology could potentially con-
tribute to renewed growth in the EU (European Com-
mission 2007, 2010, 2011b). Several European states 
and the providers which inhabit them, for example 
Hungary (for dental services) and Germany (for high 
end cancer care) see health services as a growth sec-
tor, and have expressed their interest in increasing the 
number of foreign patients that they treat.
Conclusions
 Political and business elites are coming to care 
more and more about crossborder trade in services, 
including health services. In Europe, this interest is 
a double-edged sword. On the one hand, liberalizing 
trade in services may provide the economic growth 
that EU members have been desperately seeking in 
recent years, allowing those states with highly skilled 
populations to capitalize on those assets. 
 On the other, many EU member state govern-
ments, activists, and interest groups, are wary of the 
effect that liberalization could have on their domestic 
public programs and welfare states. What member 
states actually want are crossborder spot markets - 
the ability to contract for occasional, unusual health 
procedures or workers in a way that supplements, 
without heavily impacting, domestic health systems 
(Greer and Jarman 2012). 
 But this may not be what they get in the long 
term. Acting on the initiative of the Court, EU has 
constructed a legal and policy framework which ap-
plies internal market law to health, making an internal 
market in health services more feasible. This is the 
case whether or not professionals, patients, or provid-
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ers move, and regardless of whether online medical 
services spread and widespread telemedicine use 
becomes more feasible. What matters is political and 
economic pressure to create a market. The austerity 
trend, the Commission’s proposals for market making, 
and the globalization of health markets, show that this 
pressure is building.
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 Timely and topical, The Making of a Euro-
pean Public Sphere is a worthwhile read. It does a 
very good job unpacking, analysing and challenging 
contemporary Europeanization and pinpointing the 
various ways in which media discourse and com-
munication	 networks	 influence	 decision-making	 and	
contentious politics in Europe. By questioning the ex-
isting top-down legitimating ethos favoured by Euro-
pean Union (EU) elites and various policies aimed at 
legitimating EU governance, the volume contributes 
to literature and scholarship in the areas of European-
ization, media, identity and political contention. Koop-
mans and Statham (along with thirteen contributing 
authors) cover a lot of ground, both theoretically and 
empirically, and spend considerable time cataloguing 
and investigating the EU’s legitimacy ‘problems’ and 
public	 sphere	 deficit.	 The	 ‘claim-making	 approach’	
they	utilise	 permits	 discussion	 to	 flow	 from	sources	
of information, e.g. media, to the ‘collective public 
actors’ that utilise it, e.g. social movement organiza-
tions.  
 The book is divided into eleven chapters, not 
including Statham’s very thorough and useful introduc-
tory chapter. It would seem the book’s singular task is 
to explain and understand democratic legitimacy in 
the context of contemporary media discourse, com-
munication networks (i.e. media) and political conten-
tion, and by extension, how a more open and partici-
patory Europe can be realised by way of a European 
public sphere. All the chapters, in one way or another, 
aim to elucidate the emergence, non-emergence or 
partial emergence of a European public sphere, and 
various modes and channels of communication are 
scrutinised to determine how each contributes to its 
eventual development. A very competent group of 
scholars have done well to add an empirical dimen-
sion to what has thus far been (and could still eas-
ily be) a wholly theoretical debate. Moreover, as with 
most good books, it does an excellent job orienting 
the reader to its method, methodology, and concep-
tual framework. So while it borrows from social move-
ment and political sociological literature, it does chart 
its own course with respect to theorising about ‘the’ 
European public sphere.     
 The interdisciplinary character of this volume, 
and of the contributors, is proof positive that Euro-
Book Reviews
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peanization, as a paradigm or heuristic, continues to 
advance and mature, zigzagging through disciplines, 
theoretical approaches, and frameworks. With many 
(if not most) of the social sciences represented, this 
volume offers readers an encompassing analysis of 
‘media discourse and political contention,’ and the 
‘politicization of European policies.’ Furthermore, 
and again owing to its interdisciplinary methodology, 
it	considers	the	‘impact’	and	‘influence’	of	EU	politics	
on Europeans, national states, and mass media, and 
how integration (and perceptions thereof) frame politi-
cal mobilization, collective action, and more generally 
claim-making.  Concern for a European public sphere 
is never far away, and the authors do well to link their 
findings	back	to	this	central	consideration.							
 Their argument is two-fold: (1) for the EU and 
its institutions (both collectively and discretely) to main-
tain and/or gain a real sense of democratic legitimacy, 
as the authors of The Making of a European Public 
Sphere suggest, journalists and lawmakers must act 
purposefully and forthrightly to supply Europeans with 
relevant information about EU institutions and Euro-
pean decision-making, and; (2) for this model to work, 
the EU should endeavour to work ‘with’ and ‘through’ 
national parliamentarians, media and civil society. A 
top-down approach would further alienate the Europe-
an public. As Statham argues, “for there to be anything 
that meaningfully resembles a public sphere at all, Eu-
ropean decision making needs to be made visible to 
citizens” (p. 5). And in the post ‘permissive consensus’ 
Europe, a Europe characterised by cross-cutting and 
overlapping policy spheres, it becomes all the more 
important for Europeans to engage European law-
makers directly, through mediating institutions. 
 Koopmans and Statham’s volume is useful, 
and welcome, for two main reasons. First, it does 
well to push the debate on Europeanization, integra-
tion and the European ‘public sphere’ forward, utilis-
ing cases and empirics to ground what has been, up 
until this point, a predominantly theoretical discussion. 
Second, it presents theoreticians with an answer to 
a vitally important question: What should (or could) a 
European public sphere look like? Stratham suggests 
“allowing the national politics that people understand 
to do the job of providing legitimacy to the EU is much 
more likely to be sustainable, meaningful, and effec-
tive” (p. 305). Alas, a European public sphere will de-
velop not top-down, but out of routinized political con-
tention, mobilization and contestation at the national 
state and local levels. This would be the only way to 
appropriately empower and animate Europeans and 
European lawmakers.    
 Readership: Senior undergraduate and gradu-
ate students taking courses on European integration 
or European media, and practitioners (i.e. policy mak-
ers) concerned with the EU’s democratic (and public 
sphere)	deficit.
Neil Cruickshank, Algoma University (Canada)
Chalmers, Damian, Davies, Gareth and Monti, Gior-
gio. European Union Law Second Edition. Cambridge 
University Press, 2010. 
 This volume is the second edition of European 
Union Law, in which the authors give a thorough ex-
planation of the creation of law, as well as the imple-
mentation of the law and what such laws mean. This 
volume explains the impact of European Union law 
within countries as well as at the supranational govern-
ment level. The authors indicate the role and strength 
of individual member states, while emphasizing the 
European Union (EU) body of governance as a col-
laborative	and	influential	force	that	oversees	the	best	
interests of individual member states. The implications 
of EU policy and expectations of member states are 
outlined in a way that allows the reader to fully grasp 
the concept of EU law and the EU Court. The reader is 
pulled	in	within	the	first	sentence	of	the	preface,	which	
begins by detailing the Myth of Europa and the rela-
tion to Europe. The authors explain that the myth has 
many meanings, including working together collabora-
tively	to	establish	unified	goals	and	objectives,	as	well	
as the negative connotations that the myth holds. It 
is a truly candid example of the way in which the EU 
operates and interacts. While there is collaboration, 
there is also dissent; it is not easy to maintain a bal-
ance between a supranational governing power and 
individual member state sovereignty. The unique and 
intriguing way in which the authors begin telling the 
story of the development of the EU, sets the stage for 
the entire volume. In the same way that this volume 
begins by describing the cover, the reader moves ef-
fortlessly through the evolution of the EU, EU Institu-
tions, law, governance, citizenship, policy, economics 
and law enforcement. This volume has been edited to 
include revisions following the Lisbon Treaty, and the 
implications thereof. 
 This volume is divided into twenty-four chap-
ters that elaborately detail the inner mechanisms of 
the EU, beginning with the formulation of the EU and 
the	Treaty	on	European	Union.	The	first	chapter	out-
lines the development of EU law and the treaty that 
ultimately led to an increased amount of collaboration 
between EU powerhouse states.  While the develop-
ment of the EU did not occur overnight, the authors 
give an in depth account of all treaties leading up the 
formulation of the EU that is known and respected to-
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day. Despite bumps and hurdles along the way, this 
led to the Lisbon Treaty to overcome the fractions 
within the EU and allowed it to continue as it is known 
today. The Treaty of Lisbon established asymmetric 
integration provisions that explain when countries can 
leave the EU, be removed from the EU, require more 
cooperation and determine when new legislation is 
necessary to adopt amongst all governing Member 
States. The authors go on to describe EU Institutions, 
Member States, governing bodies and voting rights, 
leading up to a description of the adoption of EU law, 
policies and procedures. Throughout each section of 
the volume, the authors provide various articles, laws 
and case studies to enhance the reader’s understand-
ing of EU protocol and standard operating procedures. 
 From the establishment of the EU, the authors 
move to describe the EU judiciary order within the EU, 
indicating that the judiciary order is tasked with ensuring 
that EU law is observed, as well as delineating between 
EU treaties as they are written and the proper imple-
mentation of such treaties. Once the Court has made a 
judgment, it is expected that the national governments 
adopt the judgment as law as quickly possible. While 
EU law is expected to be implemented across Member 
States, national governments remain sovereign pow-
ers. For this reason, there is often a lag between the 
adoption of EU law and the implementation of EU law in 
individual Member States. 
The individual sections of the volume are explained in 
the table of contents in the front of the volume, and then 
the contents of each individual chapter are reiterated at 
the	beginning	of	the	chapter	and	again	in	the	first	para-
graph of the chapter. Given that the volume is mapped 
out so well, explaining the contents of each chapter 3 
times gives too much repetition. Various excerpts from 
EU Court cases are expertly placed throughout the vol-
ume in a manner which allows for thought provoking 
reflection	as	the	reader	moves	from	one	section	to	the	
next. This volume is thorough, in that it explains the 
foundation of EU law very well, and this is where those 
who are studying EU law should begin their study. 
 This volume is thorough and complete and of-
fers the reader an in depth understanding of the foun-
dation on which the EU was build, as well as an under-
standing of how EU laws and policies move from the 
EU to individual national governmental systems. De-
pending on the previous knowledge of the reader, the 
volume need not be read in entirety, but for those who 
are unfamiliar with the EU system and governance, it is 
strongly recommended to do so. This volume is recom-
mended for those who are interested in understanding 
the foundation and key cases of EU law.
Kathryn Breitenborn Kigera
The George Washington University
Daviter, Falk. Policy Framing in the European Union. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
 What impact do issue frames and framing 
strategies have on the EU policy process? Daviter’s 
book provides an intriguing answer that says issue 
frames have systematic causal effects on subsequent 
policy dynamics (p. 20). The point is the Commis-
sion, and various interest groups, attempt to activate 
salient issues of policy frames in ways that promote 
their interests. In a research agenda that is somewhat 
akin to constructivism, frames create rather follow in-
terests. As the policy process involves a series of se-
quential decisions and shopping for favorable venues, 
opposing and supporting coalitions change over time 
even though the issue remains the same. Moreover, 
as policy twists and turns over time, inter-institutional 
rather than intra-institutional dynamics become more 
salient. This implies once policy becomes “airborne” 
framing	and	reframing	strategies	privilege	conflict	(or	
cooperation) across institutional actors, e.g., the Com-
mission and the Parliament, rather than within them, 
e.g., across Directorates-General (DG).
	 Daviter	explores	the	important	field	of	biotech-
nology policy since its placement on the EU agenda 
in the late 1980s up to the reforms of the mid-2000s. 
More	 specifically,	 he	 looks	 at	 three	 Directives	 and	
one Regulation, trying to understand why some were 
adopted and then revised, others adopted and then 
repealed, and still others vetoed and then adopted. 
Tracing the issues through the policy process, he ex-
plores various outcomes in an effort to assess the abil-
ity	of	the	Commission	to	control	and	define	the	issue	
according to its own priorities and preferences. Astute 
readers can already guess the outcome. The Commis-
sion had considerable clout once the issue of biotech-
nology	was	first	introduced	and	defined	as	mainly	an	
environmental problem that needed to be regulated. 
But the Commission failed in its subsequent reframing 
efforts to prevent other groups, the Parliament, envi-
ronmental, consumer, and business groups to “hijack” 
the activation process of salient but different dimen-
sions of the issue.
 Chapters 3-5 trace the evolution of biotechnol-
ogy policy from its environmental origins to health and 
consumer protection via economic competitiveness. 
In Chapter 3, Daviter discusses the adoption of Direc-
tive 90/219 on contained use and Directive 90/220 on 
deliberate release. They essentially sought to regulate 
operations in the EU whereby non-naturally occur-
ring organisms were produced, stored, transported, 
released, or destroyed. The main objective was en-
vironmental safety and human protection. The key 
player was the DG Environment, which authored both 
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pieces of legislation. The question is why was that DG 
the main player and not DG Research or DG Industry, 
both	of	which	had	a	significant	stake	in	the	outcome	
and obviously saw the same issue from very differ-
ent perspectives. Daviter claims the answer is framing 
through the legitimacy afforded by the environmental 
chapter of the Single European Act. Moreover, the frag-
mentation and/or disinterest of opposing groups (indus-
try and the Parliament) ensured an intra-institutional 
turf battle in which DG Environment gained the upper 
hand. This is an interesting and plausible argument but 
it is not crystal clear how this explanation differs from 
traditional power or bureaucratic politics explanations 
whereby “where you stand depends on where you sit.” 
If the object of the research question is to understand 
how preferences are initially constructed, pointing to 
bureaucratic sources is not particularly novel or differ-
ent.
 Where things become truly interesting is Chap-
ter	4.	Here	the	author	traces	the	revision	of	the	first	Di-
rective in 1998 and repeal of the second in 2001. The 
Commission engaged in a deliberate reframing strategy 
whereby biotechnology’s focus shifted from a safety 
and environmental issue to one of economic competi-
tiveness and industrial growth. Spearheaded by DG In-
dustry the attempt was facilitated by the broader focus 
shift found in the 1993 Delors White Paper on Growth, 
Competitiveness and Employment. In addition, there 
was a learning curve on the part of the part of indus-
try, which recognized the need for good old fashioned 
centralized organization and strong lobbying tactics at 
the EU level as the recipe for success. This reframing 
strategy had some initial success in placing revisions 
on the Commission’s and Council’s agenda, but it hit 
the	flexing	muscles	of	an	invigorated	Parliament	eager	
to make a difference. Here the author curiously avoids 
a clear explanation of the sources of Parliament’s newly 
found interest. He explains in Chapter 6 that the Treaty 
of Maastricht does not explain the Parliament’s robust 
opposition in some cases. Rather Daviter calls for an 
endogenization of the Parliament’s role in the policy 
process. Reframing by the Commission caused the 
redefinition	 of	 interests	 and	 the	 assembling	 of	 differ-
ent coalitions around different dimensions of the issue. 
True, “co-decision…was not the problem” (p. 158), but 
only up to a point. What is true is that Parliamentary 
groups aided by environmental and consumer protec-
tion groups successfully stalled and/or diluted attempts 
to revise or repeal existing Directives on contained use 
and deliberate release. However, as the author admits 
on p. 91 the co-decision procedure complicated the fate 
of Directive 98/44 on biotechnology patents. Initially put 
to a vote at the conciliation stage in 1995, Parliament 
vetoed the text negotiated in the conciliation stage, 
essentially terminating the legislative process. A brief 
counterfactual exercise reveals that co-decision was 
the only way this could have happened. Would Parlia-
ment be able to stall or veto the Commission’s proposal 
were it not for the newly acquired powers under co-
decision? If not, then co-decision was very much “the 
problem.”
 In Chapter 5, the analysis turns to Regulation 
258/97	on	novel	food.	Influenced	by	the	prevailing	cli-
mate of the early to mid-1990s, the Regulation sought 
to	 define	 the	 threshold	 above	 which	 foods	 could	 be	
labeled	as	genetically	modified.	This	was	an	 issue	of	
dramatic importance to industry, which felt it was losing 
ground to Japan and the United States in the important 
area of research and development of novel, i.e., geneti-
cally	modified	foods.	The	important	aspect	here	is	the	
inability of the Commission to sustain focus on econom-
ic	growth	and	development	and	the	rise	of	conflict	within	
the Commission between DG Industry and DG Health 
and Consumer Protection and later DG Agriculture. 
Daviter argues that public opinion played a minor role 
because the Regulation was signed ten months after 
the announcement that the BSE mutation had jumped 
to humans. Again the argument is fully elaborated in 
Chapter 6 (pp. 156-57) and not in the empirical Chapter 
5. There is merit to this idea but counterfactual analy-
sis reveals the “truth” is more complicated. Would the 
tightening of rules and broadening of scope regarding 
food labeling have gained steam were it not for the BSE 
crisis (and generally the food scares and botched gov-
ernment responses of the 2000s)? No, to an extent; the 
Regulation	was	passed,	giving	significant	leeway	to	in-
dustry at a time when the sight of burnt cow carcasses 
was	a	daily	occurrence	in	Europe.	But	it	is	very	difficult	
to conceive tighter rules not legitimized or supported 
by public opinion which by early 2000 was scared stiff 
by food scares linked, rightly or wrongly, to genetically 
modified	organisms.	Besides,	the	ability	to	reframe	bio-
technology as an issue of health and consumer protec-
tion found an ally in DG Agriculture, which was engaged 
at the time in wide-ranging reforms. It is quite possible 
to explain Commissioner Fischler’s support for stricter 
labeling and traceability rules on his need to achieve 
support for his own reform agenda regarding agricul-
ture. This is not to say that policy contestation does not 
follow reframing strategies or that once issues become 
politicized	it	is	very	difficult	to	control	outcomes	as	Da-
viter claims. Rather the point is that exogenous factors, 
perhaps structures of opportunity in the form of what 
the literature on multiple streams calls policy windows, 
and logrolling play a decisive exogenous role in shap-
ing frames or at least giving some groups the ability to 
gain the upper hand in framing struggles.
 There is much to recommend about the book. 
Perhaps	 the	 most	 important	 benefit	 is	 an	 astute	 re-
search design. Unlike most case studies of this type, 
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the	 author	 specifies	 considerable	 variance	 in	 the	 de-
pendent variable, biotechnology policy, through the in-
carnations of directives and regulation. This design in 
effect allows a precise exploration of how framing strat-
egies affect adoption of an issue. Victory at point t then 
generates	conflict,	 leading	to	subsequent	demise.	For	
example, the ability of DG Environment to monopolize 
the	definition	of	genetically	modified	organisms	(Direc-
tive 90/219) subsequently mobilized a coalition of other 
groups inside and outside the Commission to relax the 
applicable rules. 
In addition, the author makes a valiant attempt to tie the 
argument to broader debates in the EU policy process. 
In Chapter 6, he demolishes the myth of a monolithic, 
omnipotent Commission. Moreover, policy volatility and 
contestation give the Parliament a unique feature. Con-
flict	arises	not	simply	by	way	of	ideology,	as	expected	
from research in national parliaments, but also by way 
of inter-institutional contestation mostly against the 
Commission. In other words, the Parliament’s eventual 
position has less to do with substantive merit and more 
to do with appointing rapporteurs and stacking votes 
with an eye toward scoring victories against the Com-
mission and the Council. The complexity of issues and 
fluid	institutional	rules	facilitate	this	politically	rewarding	
strategy.
 However, the study falls somewhat short of 
its promise and ambition. First, there is no mention 
of	 specific	 hypotheses	 tying	 independent	 variables	 to	
the dependent variable. This is to an extent a func-
tion	of	ambiguous	specification	of	the	dependent	vari-
able. Yes, policy adoption, veto, repeal, and revision, 
constitute variance but the absence of conditions and 
mechanisms that link variance across issues leaves the 
reader with an ad hoc impression. Indeed, how does 
the explanation of adopting Directive 90/219 relate to 
the initial veto of Directive 98/44? Frames do make a 
difference,	but	which	specific	frames	increase	the	likeli-
hood of adoption and which ones do not? The author’s 
argument is the constellation of supporting coalitions 
at time t is broken and re-assembled differently at time 
t+1 because of framing strategies. But which strategies 
are relevant – salami tactics, inter-institutional confron-
tation,	 information	monopolies,	 or	 conflict	 expansion?	
We need a clear answer on what works and what does 
not and under what conditions across issues as well as 
across time. Unfortunately, the author fails to provide an 
explicit list of such conditions.
 Second, the evidence is not well integrated to 
the theory. There are of course theoretical and empiri-
cal chapters, but the argument does not have conti-
nuity	and	flow.	It	appears	to	be	a	deductive	argument	
with an inductive feel. Theory is elaborated in Chapter 
2 where Daviter discusses the origins of the framing 
approach.	 He	 first	 traces	 theoretical	 antecedents	 to	
Schattschneider’s	pioneering	work	on	conflict	manage-
ment and agenda-setting. He then suggests how “orga-
nizationally entrenched policy frames reduce problem 
complexity…define	 actors’	 stakes…and	 demarcate	 a	
decision’s scope and applicability” (p. 40). However, he 
does not provide a series of explicit hypotheses, which 
can	then	be	referred	and	discarded	or	confirmed	during	
the empirical sections. As a result, the empirical ma-
terial stands curiously divorced (though organized) by 
theory. The reader is left to fend for himself until Chap-
ter 6 where the author pulls everything together in an 
informative and useful theoretical chapter.
 Finally, the author misses the opportunity to tell 
the reader up front why biotechnology is such an impor-
tant	field	and	how	generalizable	the	results	can	be	from	
this	analysis.	Apart	from	experts	in	the	field,	why	should	
the rest of us care? What can we learn from biotechnol-
ogy	that	we	cannot	from	other	fields	and	to	what	extent	
can	the	findings	be	replicated	or	at	least	be	applicable	
to	other	fields?	This	 is	done	 in	Chapters	3	and	6,	 the	
beginning	of	the	empirical	evidence	and	the	final	theo-
retical wrap up, but by that time, the reader and author 
have missed the boat. 
 This is a valuable book despite its shortcom-
ings. To the extent that it constitutes the beginning of a 
productive research agenda on issue frames, the effort 
succeeds admirably. But more work needs to be done 
to reach the approach’s full potential.
Nikolaos Zahariadis
University of Alabama at Birmingham
Wells, Sherrill Brown. Jean Monnet: Unconventional 
Statesman. Boulder (CO): Lynne Rienner, 2011.
 Sherrill Brown Wells has produced a compelling 
and concise new biography of the father of all Fathers 
of	Europe,	Jean	Monnet.	What	follows	first	presents	the	
contents of the book, and then discusses its relevance 
for political scientists. 
 Jean Monnet: Unconventional Statesman clear-
ly falls under the category of historical biography. In 
fact, the book largely follows Monnet’s own memoirs 
and Duchêne’s now classic biography, and the story 
is presented in a strictly chronological order. Chapter 
1 is dedicated to Monnet’s “formative years”, from his 
upper-middle class childhood in Cognac to his political 
entrepreneurship during and after World War I (during 
which he sponsored a buyers’ cartel of the French and 
British governments, and learned a lot from the supra-
national operations of the Wheat Executive), and on to 
his private economic activities. Chapter 2 covers the 
years from 1938 to 1943, and documents not only Mon-
net’s	 growing	 influence	 but	 also	 his	 firm	 belief	 in	 the	
virtues of international economic planning, particularly 
between France and the United Kingdom at times of 
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war. According to Professor Brown Wells, during that 
period “one of Monnet’s major achievements was to 
persuade the British to join the French in large joint 
orders for US aircraft in March 1940” (p. 51). Chapter 
3	presents	Monnet’s	activities	during	the	final	years	of	
the war effort, including his think-tank-like efforts to de-
fine	French	(and	European)	post-war	policy.	The	emer-
gence of Monnet’s idea of a sort of supranational “Eu-
ropean entity” around the Rhine industrial basin (p. 85) 
is nicely depicted and adequately referenced. Chapter 
4 then turns to Monnet’s role as head of the ambitious 
Commissariat Général au Plan. Professor Brown Wells 
does	a	particularly	good	job	in	depicting	Monnet’s	influ-
ence	in	defining	a	down-to-earth,	liberal	(as	opposed	to	
nationalist), pro-Atlantic French policy.
 Chapters 5 to 8 are dedicated to Monnet’s 
leadership	 first	 in	 forging	 a	 united	 Europe,	 and	 then	
in deepening it. Chapter 5 covers the creation of the 
Coal and Steel Community, which is attributed to “Mon-
net’s conceptual breakthrough” (at p. 128), namely the 
idea that European integration could only be achieved 
if a political structure helped contain German industrial 
power, thereby calming French fears of German indus-
trial domination. Professor Brown Wells’ account of the 
Paris negotiations of 1950-51 is particularly instructive, 
highlighting as it does the twin facts of Pareto-improving 
cooperation and power-based bargaining, often in the 
shadow of American preferences. Chapter 6 turns to the 
failure of the European Defense Community, and subtly 
attributes it not only to geopolitical factors and Mendès 
France’s (curiously spelled Mendès-France throughout 
the book) need for manoeuvre after the French losses 
in Vietnam, but also, at least in part, to the failures of 
the ECSC even in core common market policies such 
as antitrust (p. 173). Chapter 7 covers the years from 
1954 to 1958, including the origination, negotiation, and 
ratification	of	the	EEC	and	Euratom	treaties.	Although	
this is probably the less interesting chapter in this biog-
raphy, it does include a thought-provoking section on 
the	French	preference	for	monetary	and	financial	inte-
gration. Chapters 8 and 9 cover the last two decades of 
Monnet’s	life	(as	an	advocate	with	declining	influence,	
particularly in his own country), and a critical but ulti-
mately enthusiastic assessment of his contribution to 
the uniting of Europe.     
 Turning to the relevance of this book for politi-
cal scientists, it should be noted from the outset that 
this	is	a	historical,	not	a	social-scientific,	piece	of	work.	
The emphasis lies much more on the factual accuracy 
of detailed information than on theory or method. For 
example, although much of the text is about Monnet’s 
ideas, networks, and actions, these are not interpreted 
in the light of an explicit theoretical framework. Simi-
larly, although the author makes several causal infer-
ences, many of which go beyond the biographer’s nat-
ural quest for the reasons why people hold particular 
preferences, none of them is supported by any sort of 
explicit research design, be it a counter-factual or a 
quest	for	the	coefficient	of	a	causal	variable.	Similarly,	
the author’s all-apparent desire to eschew controversy 
leads her to employ some unclear concepts or charac-
terizations. For example, she writes that “Monnet’s idea 
was that [the High Authority of the ECSC] would regu-
late business through competition, pricing and invest-
ment pooling, and the supervision of wages but would 
not replace private enterprise” (at p. 144), but does not 
elaborate on exactly how competition can thrive in such 
a tightly regulated political economy. 
 Still, there is a lot to learn from this book. First, at 
the level of pure and simple facts, Europeanists get a lot 
on their plate. Compare, for example, Andrew Moravc-
sik’s well-known liberal inter-governmentalism to Brown 
Well’s insistence that time and again international ne-
gotiators in the twentieth century enjoyed enough free-
dom of action to adopt policies which were not sup-
ported by peak business associations or trade unions 
of their home countries. Similarly, although Moravcsik 
finds	that	the	first	supranational	competition	policy	was	
established in 1957 at Erhard’s insistence and against 
French preferences, Brown Wells demonstrates that it 
was actually invented by Monnet in 1950, against both 
Germany (including Erhard) and (more surprisingly) 
French public opinion and business associations. This, 
I believe, has direct implications for other state-of-the-
art works in EU studies, such as Simon Hix’s character-
ization of competition policy as an essentially Pareto-
efficient	policy	of	 little	political/redistributive	 relevance	
(Hix 2008: 92).                             
 At a more theoretical level, Professor Brown 
Wells has written a biography which challenges the 
view that all that matters in politics is formal rules and 
structures. Whereas, for example, Crombez and Hix 
recently argued that “the power of the Commission fol-
lowing the SEA had less to do with the personality of 
Jacques Delors or successful policy leadership by the 
Commission than with the change in the legislative role 
of the Commission as a result of the shift to QMV” this 
book serves to remind us that, if Delors (Monnet) had 
not been president of the Commission (High Authority), 
then the Commission (High Authority) would not have 
gotten	these	powers	in	the	first	place.	Like	Nixon	in	Chi-
na, Monnet and Delors may have been given the free-
dom to do what they did precisely because they were 
French. The same may possibly be said of Hallstein. 
And, on the less performing side, of Rey, Thorn, Santer, 
Prodi, Barroso, and perhaps also Jenkins. 
Yannis Karagiannis
Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals 
22     Summer 2012 EUSA Review
Documentary by Smith, Don C.  Jean Monnet, The Fa-
ther of Europe. http://law.du.edu/index.php/jean-mon-
net-father-of-europe/documentary, 2011.
 As the European Union (EU) is grappling with 
the	financial	crisis,	the	raison	d’être	of	the	EU	institutions	
is increasingly cast into doubt. Since EU institutions are 
becoming ever more politicized and unpopular, distinct-
ly political defenses of the European project no longer 
seem to carry normative weight. In the last decade or 
so, it appears, the leitmotif of European integration has 
largely	been	reduced	to	national	and	individual	benefits	
accruing from economic integration. With the EURO 
crisis	exposing	the	dangerous	structural	deficiencies	of	
the common currency, that last point of retreat is, evi-
dently, less and less credible as well. For those inter-
ested in the original rationale of the European project 
and its history, a recent documentary by Don C. Smith 
entitled Jean Monnet, The Father of Europe  provides 
a	timely	reconsideration	of	 the	postwar	political	 justifi-
cations of European integration through an investiga-
tion of the life and personal motivations of arguably the 
most	influential	figure	in	early	European	integration	his-
tory. The project is ambitious since the director, Don C. 
Smith,	 is	not	a	professional	filmmaker	but	 teaching	at	
the University of Denver Sturm College Of Law. Smith 
succeeds in producing a documentary that is interest-
ing for teachers and students of European integration 
alike by combining original footage of Jean Monnet and 
Robert Schuman with insightful interviews of Monnet’s 
close collaborators such as Max Kohnstamm, Georges 
Berthoin, and Jacques-René Rabier as well as inter-
views of historians and experts of Monnet’s biography.
 The documentary traces Monnet’s vita by be-
ginning with his upbringing in rural France, his early life 
as a salesman for his family’s cognac business, his ca-
reer in the international political scene in the interwar 
period, and his role in the organization of the Allied War 
effort	during	the	Second	World	War.	The	film	then	turns	
to Monnet’s role in postwar Europe by emphasizing his 
relationship	with	Schuman,	his	influential	position	in	the	
transgovernmental European space of postwar Europe, 
and his role in establishing the Action Committee for the 
United States of Europe after the disappointment over 
the rejection of the European Defense Community in 
1954. Smith shows vividly that in Monnet’s and others’ 
normative	reasoning	the	overall	justification	of	political	
and economic integration is identical: sharing sover-
eignty	provides	a	way	to	manage	conflict	and	competi-
tion peacefully through law instead of allowing national 
rivalries	to	produce	violent	conflict	or	even	war.	The	pri-
ority of this reasoning is particularly emphasized through 
the highlights of the documentary including video foot-
age of Robert Schuman announcing the Schuman Plan 
as well as an audio recording of Monnet’s speech at the 
first	session	of	the	Common	Assembly	of	the	European	
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). With all the nec-
essary contemporary criticism of the EU’s institutional 
edifice,	 one	 does	 well	 to	 remember	 this	 foundational	
rationale of the European project. As Max Kohnstamm 
puts it, sharing sovereignty implies a degree of shared 
‘co-responsibility’ for the involved partners, a notion that 
tends to be forgotten in current political debates. 
 The second main strength of the movie is that 
it relates the personal memories and experiences of 
some of Monnet’s closest collaborators. These inter-
views manifestly demonstrate Monnet’s qualities as a 
leader. One is especially struck by the fondness with 
which Berthoin, Kohnstamm, and Rabier describe Mon-
net’s personality. Their emotional attachment is still 
plain to see after all those years. More importantly, 
these interviews give the interested viewer a sense of 
the	sources	of	influence	that	Monnet	had.	Not	operat-
ing on the stages of ‘big politics’, his was the politics of 
personal ties, especially below ministerial level. As po-
litical scientists are increasingly appreciating the role of 
networks and what sociologists refer to as social capital 
in administrative and transgovernmental relations, the 
interviews provide a sense of the tactics that Monnet 
employed	to	influence	the	political	fortunes	of	European	
integration. Georges Berthoin, for example, points out 
that Monnet always knew “the one who is preparing the 
paper or sometimes the man who is going to speak on 
the basis of the paper”, and, by thus ensuring that his 
point of view would be presented to the actors in power 
without necessarily speaking to them and convincing 
them himself, he would be able to spread his ideas 
through the political hierarchy.
 However, while the documentary’s focus on 
Monnet as an individual produces interesting insights, 
there are certain inherent weaknesses. At times, the pa-
thos enacted by the imagery and the narrator appears 
exaggerated. No doubt, Monnet was an important in-
dividual, but the conjunction of narrative and imagery 
tends to draw a picture of Monnet as a ‘hero’ of Europe-
an	Integration	in	which	he	becomes	a	figure	of	almost	
mystical reverie that is analogous to the quasi-saintly 
status of the American ‘founding fathers’. A balanced 
picture would have been more appropriate, a picture in 
which Monnet’s contributions are weighted against the 
contributions of other groups and individuals as much 
as the economic and geopolitical conditions in post-
war Europe that were conducive to the creation of the 
early institutions such as the ECSC and the Treaties of 
Rome. 
	 With	 these	caveats	 in	mind,	 the	film	 is	a	valu-
able and timely resource. Smith still succeeds in utiliz-
ing the affective potential of the medium to make an 
important	 point:	 the	 primary	 justification	 of	 European	
integration does not concern harnessing the economic 
benefits	 of	 a	 larger	market	 or	 the	 efficient	 orchestra-
tion of international cooperation but the responsibility 
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of guaranteeing peaceful cooperation among European 
peoples’ and governments. Smith combines this mes-
sage with a wealth of historical insight about Monnet as 
an	individual	and	the	sources	of	his	political	influence.	
Thus,	as	a	reminder	as	well	as	a	resource,	the	film	is	




Kelemen, R. Daniel. Eurolegalism: The Transformation 
of Law and Regulation in the European Union. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 2011.
 Eurolegalism, according to Kelemen, is a vari-
ant of adversarial legalism that is arising in the Europe-
an Union as a result of the EU’s fragmented institutional 
structure and drive toward economic liberalization.  In 
this book, Kelemen describes the new adversarial le-
galism in the EU, examines the causal mechanisms 
contributing to this phenomenon, and presents case 
studies of securities, competition, and disability rights 
to demonstrate the rise of Eurolegalism.
 Kelemen asserts that adversarial legalism arose 
first	 in	America.	 Its	 features,	which	 it	 shares	with	 the	
European	variety,	 include	very	specific	 rules	 requiring	
rigorous transparency and disclosure; regulatory en-
forcement characterized by legal methods; expensive 
and protracted court cases using “megalawyering tech-
niques”; judicial review and intervention in administra-
tion; and increased private litigation concerning regula-
tion	of	government	and	private	firm	practices	(Kelemen	
2011: 6).
 Although the variant of Eurolegalsm in Europe 
is more restrained than that in the US, the basic char-
acteristics remain the same. In the EU, Kelemen claims 
in chapters 2 and 3, opaque and informal national reg-
ulatory styles long predominated. However, these re-
lied on relatively small numbers of players and closed 
systems. Kelemen states “This informal, self-regulatory 
approach was underpinned by the one form of regula-
tion that was strictly enforced at the time: restrictions 
on access to the market” (Kelemen 2011: 94). This, of 
course, presented a serious barrier to the Single Mar-
ket. Once national regulatory schemes were disman-
tled,	however,	national	and	EU	officials	needed	to	find	a	
way to re-regulate the market in the new environment. 
In particular, liberalization and deregulation of Europe-
an	financial	markets	“simultaneously	undermined	exist-
ing national system of securities regulation and created 
pressures for new forms of reregulation at the EU level” 
(Kelemen 2011: 95). 
	 And	new	systems	have	indeed	arisen	to	fill	the	
gap. In regulating securities, Kelemen suggests, the EU 
turned to a largely American system in order to protect 
investors.	While	 imposing	specific,	detailed	 regulation	
reliant upon disclosure and transparency, the EU tends 
to emphasize private enforcement. This ensures equal 
treatment for all member states, foreign actors, and 
new entrants. In disability rights, the turn to Eurolegal-
ism has manifested in a shift to a rights-based model of 
disability in the EU, away from the parochial care model 
of previous years. The fragmented political regime in 
the EU has contributed to Eurolegalization pressures; 
policymakers understand that judiciaries are more in-
sulated from political pressures and backlashes than 
some legislatures and executives. The EU has a very 
small budget and thus cannot fully realize its adminis-
trative capability. In the absence of a fully developed 
administrative structure in Brussels that would be ca-
pable of centralized enforcement of EU law, the courts 
serve as a proxy administrator. 
 Examining the impact of EU policy and the 
shift to Eurolegalism in various EU countries includ-
ing France, Germany, the Netherlands, it is clear that 
in some areas these countries were already moving 
toward a more adversarial legalistic regulatory regime. 
The EU is not the only cause of this move, but it is cer-
tainly, as Kelemen demonstrates, one of the factors that 
has engendered this shift.
 As a result, the EU has produced a large num-
ber	 of	 specific	 and	 legally	 enforceable	 norms.	 These	
specific	 rules	are	being	enforced	by	 legal	means;	pri-
vate citizens are now being addressed using a “lan-
guage of rights” that encourages citizens to use the EU 
and EU legal means as well as national courts to en-
force EU regulations as they pertain to individuals. In 
effect, Kelemen demonstrates that the EU compliance 
regime “watchdog role” has been shifted to citizens and 
other entities with legal standing in the EU. It is the legal 
standing	of	citizens	and	private	firms	that	distinguishes	
the	 EU	 legal	 system.	Citizens	 and	 firms	 have	 perpe-
trated an explosion of EU regulatory cases. The shifting 
of	this	responsibility	to	private	citizens	and	firms	by	the	
Commission has coincided with demands for social and 
civil rights at the EU level; citizens seem ready and will-
ing to take on this role. All of these processes have con-
verged to create a culture of adversarial legalism, using 
citizens to enforce EU regulation through the courts. 
 The book on the whole is well written and en-
gaging. It endeavors to place legal studies at the heart 
of EU theorizing. Many EU theories place little empha-
sis on the courts, but it is clear from Kelemen’s argu-
ment that we cannot ignore the courts and the actions 
of the courts. It is also clear that this book would be in-
teresting to those who study comparative legal studies, 
as well as students of EU governance.
Heather A. D. Mbaye
University of West Georgia
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Falkner, Gerda (ed.). The EU’s Decision Traps. Com-
paring Policies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
 The joint decision-trap (JDT) is one of the 
most powerful analytical concepts in policy-research. 
Formulated in the 1980s on the example of the Ger-
man federalism, it analytically captures the dilemma 
of policy making in large entities: the attractiveness 
(and sometimes even the necessity) of addressing 
specific	 problems	 at	 higher	 levels	 of	 the	 polity	 and,	
in	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 difficulty	 of	 coming	 to	 a	 com-
mon decision among diverse and self-interested gov-
ernments acting unanimously. As a result, regimes 
meeting the institutional preconditions of JDT tend to 
underperform as regards effective problem-solving 
or, eventually, fail to produce policy output at all. The 
EU with its quasi-federal institutional set-up is such a 
regime. However, while it certainly witnessed several 
instances of stalemate and mediocre policies, it has 
also undergone major changes. The book by Gerda 
Falkner and collaborators reevaluates the operation of 
the JDT in European policy-making in the light of these 
developments. 
 The objective of the volume is to provide a 
more	“fine-grained	judgement	of	blockage	and	break-
through” (p. 2) by reviewing policy by policy. The em-
pirical chapters, written by recognized specialists in 
their policy areas, start with a (quantitative) summary 
of the legislative output and complement this over-
view by selected, case study-based observations. The 
reader	 benefits	 from	 cumulated	 expertise,	 empirical	
richness	 and	 detailed	 insights	 in	 specific	 legislative	
negotiations. The fact that the book reassembles the 
empirical material that is otherwise dispersed across 
more specialist literature is one of its greatest merits.
 The empirical chapters follow the analytical 
framework outlined in the starting section. Here, Ger-
da Falkner distinguishes two groups of mechanisms 
alleviating the EU’s decision-traps: consensus-promo-
tion and exit. Consensus-promotion can be found on 
issue-level (watering down, side-payments, opt-outs) 
or on the actors-level (socialization, learning, diffuse 
reciprocity). EU policies, here in particular the environ-
mental policy, offer numerous examples for the issue-
redefinition.	By	contrast,	with	the	exception	of	the	for-
eign policy, the book does not provide much evidence 
that the socialization effects can explain the shape of 
European policies. 
 Exit mechanisms, on the other hand, all involve 
the strategic use of institutions, either the legislative 
setting or Treaty provisions. The former is represent-
ed by arena or quorum shifting; the latter typically in-
volves bypassing the Council by the ECJ or the pursuit 
of policy goals by implementing the competition rules 
by the Commission. At the intersection of both logics 
lies	the	Commission’s	strategy	of	linking	up	of	specific	
policy issues to the Internal Market provision. This has 
been effective in social policy, environment, energy 
and, to a certain extent, in tax policy. The success of 
this strategy becomes visible especially when a long-
term policy development is considered. It seems that 
the Commission, having a different time-horizon than 
the national governments, wisely employs the power 
of endurance. Indeed, if the cross-policy comparison 
would entail a contest of exit strategies, the Commis-
sion and the ECJ would be the indisputable winners. 
Both actors capitalize on Treaty interpretation and 
benefit	 from	“unintended	consequences”	of	 the	EU’s	
constitutional provisions. 
 This comes as no surprise. If the volume can 
enhance our knowledge about the engines of Euro-
pean integration it is by explicitly linking the suprana-
tional	agency	to	the	“policy’s	quality	of	specification	on	
the level of EU primary law” (p. 254). The more spe-
cific	the	political	goals	outlined	in	the	Treaty,	the	higher	
the chances for political activism. Anti-discrimination is 
a nice example of policy innovation developed close 
to the Treaty text and driven by the Commission and 
the Court’s entrepreneurship. Furthermore, the book 
offers quite interesting and nuanced perspectives on 
institutional innovation. The introduction of QMV, for 
instance,	was	not	sufficient	to	facilitate	policy-making	
in	 financial	 services,	 whereas	 an	 evasion	 into	 tech-
nical committees turned out as a promising route to 
take. Moreover, the EP arises as a highly ambiguous 
player, as it considerably complicated the policy-mak-
ing in justice and home affaires but facilitated it in ag-
riculture and environment. 
	 The	most	inspiring	findings	of	the	volume	touch	
upon the very nature of member states’ (inter)actions. 
It seems that both the supranational agency and the 
“rules	of	the	polity”	alter	the	way	governments	define	
and pursue their interests. Falkner described this 
mechanism as “changing the opportunity structures of 
governments” (p. 243) but, unfortunately, does not of-
fer	much	of	 a	 theoretical	 refinement.	Elaborating	 on	
this particular mechanism would probably go beyond 
the scope of the book. However, it is here, where theo-
retical innovations can be made.
 The empirical contributions of the volume 
point at three topics which, in my view, demand a 
theoretical	 improvement.	The	first	one	 relates	 to	 the	
domestic and intra-governmental processes of pref-
erence formation, which, in the context of EU policy 
making, need to be complemented by considerations 
related to legal certainty. Legislative inaction, for ex-
ample, may result in alternative modes of governance 
(for instance the ECJ case law) which do not neces-
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sarily make member states better off. We still do not 
know much about how those different kinds of consid-
erations are weighted against each other. A second 
important question is how and to what extent actors 
can play with the visibility of the legislative process. 
The volume clearly shows that “subterfuge” is a viable 
exit option for the blocked Council and that policy con-
flicts	are	often	shifted	either	to	lower-level	bodies	or	to	
the implementation process. It would be interesting to 
know under which circumstances legislative struggles 
can systematically be hidden from the critical audi-
ences and what governments’ contribution to arena 
engineering actually is. Finally, the book might inspire 
researchers working with ideational approaches as it 
provides several examples of rich usage of persuasive 
strategies. What are the mechanisms that make the 
rhetorical entrapment successful? Is it (only) the infor-
mational advantage of the Commission or rather the 
nature of member states’ commitment to the internal 
market and other constitutional norms? 
 Certainly, the edited volume by Gerda Falkner 
will, both in its content and its approach, inform future 
cross-policy research related to European integration. 
It can be highly recommended to students and practi-
tioners of EU policy-making. Transversing the theoret-
ical grand debates on European integration, the book 
will also be of interest to non-Europeanists working on 
decision-making in large polities. 
Marzena Kloka
University of Bremen
